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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL PERSPECTIVE. By Morton Deutsch.t New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press. 1985. Pp. vii, 313. $27.50. 
EQUALITY IN AMERICA: THE VIEW FROM THE 
TOP. By Sidney Verbat and Gary R. Orren.2 Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. x, 334. Cloth, 
$25.00; paper, $12.50. 
Catherine Zuckert 3 
In Equality in America: The View from the Top, Sidney Verba 
and Garry Orren report the results of a complex poll of American 
leaders which shows that even the most radical leaders desire equal-
ity of opportunity rather than equality of result. And in Distributive 
Justice, Morton Deutsch argues that the "equity" theory of justice 
implicit in the search for "equal opportunity" rests on inadequate-
if not simply erroneous-assumptions about human behavior. Has 
contemporary social science then proved that the dominant Ameri-
can conception of justice is largely unfounded-both logically and 
empirically? That possibility surely deserves serious reflection. The 
studies summarized in these books were carefully designed and me-
ticulously executed. Unfortunately, the authors' broader conclu-
sions are not so carefully argued or rigorously deduced. 
After two chapters summarizing recent studies showing the 
central place the principle (or definition) of "equality" has played in 
American history, Verba and Orren report the results of their poll 
of Democratic, Republican, business, farm, labor, intellectual, 
black, and feminist leaders. The authors admit they neglected lead-
ers of the newly emergent "moral majority" or "religious right"-
their study was designed in the 1970's before such groups had be-
come quite so prominent. But, they urge, this omission does not 
create serious doubts about their main conclusion. By neglecting to 
include representatives of the religious right or Southern populists, 
however, Verba and Orren (like Thomas Edsall in The New Politics 
I. Edward Lee Thorndike Professor of Psychology and Education, Teachers College, 
Columbia University. 
I. Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professor, Harvard University. 
2. Associate Professor of Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University. 
3. Professor of Political Science, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota. 
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of Equality) present a deceptively monolithic view of more "con-
servative" American public opinion in which "Republicans" and 
"businessmen" agree on virtually all questions in stark contrast to 
the divisions of opinion (and loyalties) among more liberal Demo-
cratic, labor, farm, black, and feminist leaders. On the basis of such 
data, it becomes extremely hard, if not impossible, to understand or 
explain American elections-either GOP ascendancy in presiden-
tial elections or continuing Democratic dominance at the state and 
local levels. The skewed sample of respondents is, moreover, indic-
ative of a more fundamental problem with the definition of the is-
sues in the study. The authors define both "equality of 
opportunity" and the question of the legitimate degree of state in-
tervention in merely economic terms. Predictably, Republican and 
business leaders endorse more economic inequality and less govern-
ment intervention than farm, labor, black, or feminist leaders. Had 
Verba and Orren asked their respondents about moral issues, how-
ever, the spectrum of opinion might have looked quite different. As 
William S. Maddox and Stuart A. Lilie4 have shown, American 
public opinion is more accurately (and interestingly) portrayed in 
terms of crosscutting issues and transitory alliances among "liber-
tarians" (who oppose all forms of government intervention), "con-
servatives" (who advocate moral legislation but not necessarily 
economic controls), "liberals" (who favor government intervention 
in the economy for the sake of more egalitarian redistribution of 
income and property but oppose most social or moral regulation), 
and "populists" (who advocate both economic and social controls). 
Although American leaders accept the justice of economic ine-
quality, Verba and Orren report that they unanimously endorse 
political equality. This distinction between political and economic 
(in)equality is traditionally American, but our authors believe they 
have discovered an interesting twist. Insisting that Americans 
ought to be politically equal, leaders of all groups nevertheless 
thought that their particular group ought to have more power than 
it does at present. Here Verba and Orren see a paradox, if not a 
problem: insofar as these leaders want more power, they would 
deny the political equality of others. To this reader's mind, how-
ever, the apparent "paradox" is rather easily resolved. In a pluralis-
tic society which grants all members an equal right to advocate 
their own position, no one group is able to see its particular concep-
tion of the public interest adopted in its entirety. To the extent that 
leaders of any group believe that they represent what is truly in the 
public interest, they cannot help but be frustrated by their inevitable 
4. W. MADDOX & S. LILLIE, BEYOND LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE (1984). 
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failure to obtain all that they want and to conclude that the cause of 
justice (or the common good) would be furthered if their group 
were to obtain the power necessary to enact its vision. 
II 
In contrast to the rather uncontroversial, if incomplete results 
of the V erba-Orren survey, the practical consequences that Profes-
sor Morton Deutsch draws from a lifetime of social-psychological 
research are extremely provocative. Whether these conclusions are 
well-founded, however, is another question. 
To each according to his demonstrated ability. As Verba and 
Orren show, Americans tend to conceive of justice in proportional 
rather than strictly egalitarian terms. This conception is too nar-
row, Professor Deutsch argues. When such a conception of justice 
becomes dominant, it tends to transform even the most intimate re-
lations into quasi-economic transactions, and all human relations 
are not accurately described in terms of economic exchange. 
Deutsch's general point is surely correct, but it is not quite 
clear what follows from it, since love and marriage are not more 
accurately described in terms of justice than they are in terms of 
economic exchange. Fortunately, this is not the central point of the 
argument. Deutsch approvingly cites John Rawls's conclusion that 
no one "deserves" his particular talents any more than one "de-
serves" the family background or circumstances that foster the de-
velopment of character requisite to the development of these talents 
and hence that no one deserves a reward for the exercise of those 
abilities. But Deutsch himself does not explicitly discuss the justice 
of unequal (or any) rewards. Despite its title, his book is not de-
voted to an examination of the question of "distributive justice." 
On the contrary, apparently assuming that no human being or ac-
tivity is inherently more valuable and hence deserving of more rec-
ognition or reward than any other, Deutsch devotes himself to 
showing the problematic character of the social-psychological as-
sumptions at the foundation of the claim that human beings need 
unequal rewards as incentives to produce. The suggestion, although 
Deutsch by no means states it so baldly, is that if unequal rewards 
are not necessary as incentives, they are unjustifiable. 
The problem with treating unequal rewards as incentives is 
two-fold, Deutsch argues. In the first place, the extent to which 
unequal payment or recognition is necessary as an incentive de-
pends a great deal upon the individual's expectations; and, Deutsch 
observes, individual expectations are greatly affected by the social 
context. Those who argue that great rewards are necessary to pro-
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duce great efforts ignore the role of bargaining and negotiation in 
the determination of economic rewards. Likewise, he observes, a 
person who feels unjustly treated may after a time feel less ag-
grieved; indeed, may come to feel that a deprivation is just or de-
served, if all or even most other people seem to concur in the result. 
"Just desert" is thus a matter of psychological expectation and so-
cial manipulation more than economic exchange or objectively de-
termined psychological and social necessity. 
In the second place, studies that Deutsch has conducted for 
more than three decades at Columbia Teachers College show that it 
is by no means evident that competition results in a higher rate of 
production than cooperation. Under some circumstances people 
produce more in a cooperative, egalitarian environment than they 
do when competing against each other. 
Because Deutsch summarizes the results of so many quite dis-
parate studies, his line of argument becomes obscure at times. He 
also omits much of importance to his topic. For example, in dis-
cussing the conditions under which persons denied equal treatment 
will protest, Professor Deutsch details many of the tactics Saul 
Alinsky recommended in Rules for Radicals. One of Alinsky's ba-
sic points was, of course, that underprivileged groups can use office-
holders' concern for their reputation against them. But Deutsch 
never inquires, even speculatively, whether officeholders would act 
from such a concern if all views of justice and all human activities 
were equally valued, so that no one was reputed to be wiser, juster, 
more decent or more responsible than any other. Would anyone 
seek to write a Pulitzer Prize-winning novel if all books were 
awarded the same prize upon publication and all manuscripts were 
guaranteed publication? Clearly honor or recognition serves as an 
incentive to just as well as to productive action; it perhaps repre-
sents a greater incentive to the exercise of truly exceptional talent 
than economic reward per se. But Deutsch has no direct, much less 
sustained discussion of the issue in his book. 
In the various experiments Deutsch conducted with Columbia 
students, he discovered that they (like the American public as a 
whole) tended to prefer a proportional system of distribution (for 
economic rewards) to a purely egalitarian system (though by a 
small margin) or (by a larger margin) to a system based strictly on 
need. But in comparing the productivity of otherwise identical 
groups of students working at the same rather simple tasks under 
"winner-take-all," proportional, and egalitarian systems of distribu-
tion, he found that there was little if any difference in productivity 
between groups working under proportional and egalitarian systems 
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of distribution, and that, over time, very competitive, "winner-take-
all" distributive systems provoked feelings of resentment among the 
losers. Moreover, Deutsch discovered that differences in distribu-
tive systems had little impact on productivity. Face-to-face contact, 
he found, made groups much more cooperative and egalitarian. 
Deutsch himself specifies the limits of these experiments. In 
the first place, he admits, the Columbia students probably agreed to 
more egalitarian forms of distribution in face-to-face encounters out 
of politeness rather than principle. The economic rewards in any 
case were rather slight; so was the time involved in the experiment 
and hence the stake for any particular individual. The basic apti-
tudes, abilities, and circumstances of the Columbia students were 
rather similar and the tasks to be performed relatively simple. 
There was nothing approaching a situation in which the lives (or 
livelihoods) of all members of a group depended upon an individ-
ual's performing a task he and he alone was able to execute. In such 
a case, should rewards be equal? Will an individual altruistically 
continue to perform an arduous task--or one involving risk to him 
or herself-simply for the benefit of others, with no exceptional rec-
ognition or reward? Deutsch doesn't ask such questions nor do his 
experiments answer them. 
The limitations of his experiments do not prevent Deutsch 
from concluding in a summary description of several rather well-
known cooperative economic enterprises that egalitarian relations 
are fostered by small-scale, "face-to-face" operations, but that such 
small-scale operations can be preserved only through a kind of fed-
eral arrangement. (There is a whole line of democratic theory argu-
ing the same point as the basis for the United States Constitution, 
among other things, but Deutsch takes no notice of either tradi-
tional thinkers like Montesquieu or Tocqueville or more contempo-
rary advocates of "economic democracy" like Robert Dahl.) 
Nor do the acknowledged limitations of the research he sum-
marizes prevent Deutsch from specifying (apparently on the basis of 
these studies) ways of "preventing World War Ill." On the con-
trary, in the face of a possible nuclear holocaust, Deutsch urges, the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should move from competitive conflict to co-
operation. He does not seem to realize that the strategies he out-
lines presuppose the desirability of maintaining the status quo-the 
basis of U.S. policy since World War II but not of Soviet doctrine. 
Like some of the strategic gamesters he criticizes, Deutsch utterly 
ignores the ideological and political differences of the "players." He 
does not seem to be sufficiently aware of the obvious differences be-
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tween games played for small stakes by Columbia students and the 
competition among nations for influence and power. 
In sum: in reading these reports of often very elegantly 
designed social science research on some of the most fundamental 
political issues, one cannot help but wish that the authors would 
extend the care they take designing their questionnaires and experi-
ments to the logical interpretation of the results. It is only through 
such interpretation that the studies become available to and usable 
by nonexpert readers. Unfortunately, social scientists seem to con-
cern themselves primarily with rigorous methods of collecting data, 
not so much with methodical argumentation on the basis of that 
data. 
VIGILANTE: THE BACKLASH AGAINST CRIME IN 
AMERICA. By William Tucker.' New York: Stein and Day. 
1985. Pp. 371. $14.95. 
Steven H Go/dberg2 
Vigilante excuses subway gunman, Bernhard Goetz, as an in-
evitable product of a permissive society in which punishment may 
be delayed or avoided by process. Mr. Tucker sees the subway en-
counter between Goetz and three black youths as a microcosm of 
all that is wrong with America. The country has gone to hell in a 
hand basket, it happened during the 1960's, and "intellectuals," 
lawyers, and judges did the carrying. The decade of degeneration, 
driven by intellectual drivel and represented quintessentially by the 
Warren Court, spawned an unprecedented crime wave that, in turn, 
provoked "good people" to replace their faith in the criminal justice 
system with blazing six-guns. 
These arguments deserve serious consideration, but this book 
contributes nothing to the debate. The author's anger with those he 
views as the handmaidens of the 1960's warps not only his perspec-
tive, but his interest in research and analysis. Conclusions and an-
ger are all there is to this book. Vigilante is divided into three 
sections. The first, "What Went Wrong," focuses on what is wrong 
with the legal system: the exclusionary rule, lawyers, and judges. 
The middle, "How the System Should Work," deplores most sociol-
ogy, psychology, and criminology. The last forty-six pages contain 
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